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DEFAMATION LITIGATION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND GERMANY
ALEXANDER BRUNS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The apparent fundamental differences between the laws of
defamation in the United States and Germany suggest that a
comparison might well be considered fruitless or even impossible.
Indeed, scholars in the United States, in response to the disparities,
have generally not addressed foreign—and especially German—
solutions in the field of defamation law. Similarly, the question of
access to internal media information has not been the subject of
academic review.1 The characteristic features of common and state
law systems—a bifurcated jurisdictional system, pretrial discovery,
and jury-awarded general or punitive damages—do not invite a
comparative approach when juxtaposed with the features of civil law
systems—a monolithic civil judiciary, a system of separate actions for
Copyright © 2000 by Alexander Bruns.
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1. See, e.g., Gregory J. Thwaite & Wolfgang Brehm, German Privacy and Defamation
Law: The Right to Publish in the Shadows of the Right to Human Dignity, 8 EUR. INTEL. PROP.
R. 336, 343 (1994); Douglas W. Vick & Linda MacPherson, Anglicizing Defamation Law in the
European Union, 36 VA. J. INT. L. 933, 955-59 (1996); Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson,
An Opportunity Lost: The United Kingdom’s Failed Reform of Defamation Law, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 621 (1997). See generally INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY, CIVIL LIABILITY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE (Christian Campbell ed., 1997) (providing a remarkable overview of
the defamation laws of several European states, anglophone states, and Japan); Peter Krug,
Civil Defamation and the Press in Russia: Private and Public Interests, the 1995 Civil Code, and
the Constitution, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 847 (1995) (providing an overview of the
defamation laws in Russia).
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information without any discovery, and a variety of potential
remedies, none of which encompasses jury trial or punitive damages.
Nevertheless, the American experience in this area, as in a multitude
of other instances, has drawn the attention of legal academics and
practitioners from around the world. In Germany, the discourse on
innovation in the field of defamation law has been obliged to take
account of the legal solutions of various foreign countries, and the
United States enjoys a particularly prominent position.2
This Article proceeds from the premise that a fruitful
comparison of the defamation laws of the United States and Germany
need not be a one–way transaction. Rather, it presumes that a
reciprocal consideration of the different schemes will convey mutual
understanding and provide deeper insights into the inherent
justification of traditional legal concepts in the respective legal
systems. A more thorough evaluation is likely to disclose significant
similarities in the legal structure and protection of essential cultural
values of modern democratic societies. Since the United States is
examining possible reforms to its own defamation laws,3 the
immanent structures of defamation law and dialogue on reform in a
civil law country such as Germany are of particular interest to the
American jurist.
The question of access to a journalist’s work product in
defamation cases involves a considerable number of problems, and
most can be reduced to the dichotomy of personality rights: the right
to privacy and the freedom of speech. The free flow of information to
and from the media is an essential element of a modern democracy
and the confidentiality of sources tends to protect this basic
democratic warranty, since potential media informers are more
willing to submit sensitive information if they are afforded at least
some anonymity.4 This might be one reason why, until very recently,
2. See, e.g., ASTRID STADLER, Persönlichkeitsrecht contra Medienfreiheit, 1989
JURISTENZEITUNG 1084; ROLF STÜRNER, Die verlorene Ehre des Bundesbürgers—Bessere
Spielregeln für die öffentliche Meinungsbildung, 1994 JURISTENZEITUNG 865; NOLTE, DER
BELEIDIGUNGSSCHUTZ IN DER FREIHEITLICHEN DEMOKRATIE (1992); STARK, EHRENSCHUTZ
IN DEUTSCHLAND (1996); AXEL BEATER, ZIVILRECHTLICHER SCHUTZ VOR DER PRESSE ALS
KONKRETISIERTES VERFASSUNGSRECHT (1996).
3. See generally UNIF. CORRECTION OR CLARIFICATION OF DEFAMATION ACT
(Proposed Official Draft) 12 U.L.A. 291 (1993); Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to
Defamation Law Through Uniform Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 291 (1994) (providing a thorough discussion of the genesis and text of this proposal).
4. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17488/90, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123, 143
(1996) (Commission report) (“Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions
for press freedom. . . . Without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the
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German courts and commentators alike had not even entertained the
idea of a plaintiff’s right of access to internal media information in
order to improve the evidentiary basis for defamation litigation.5
Notably, it has been the American paradigm of pretrial discovery
against media defendants, inter alia, that has induced German
scholars to review and challenge the traditional doctrine that
generally denied any substantial access to internal media information.
The first part of this comparative analysis addresses the arsenal
of civil remedies in the law of defamation, followed by the
prerequisites for access to internal media information. The focus
then shifts to the different types of obtainable information before
turning to an exploration of the journalist’s privilege not to reveal
sources. In consideration of cultural differences between Germany
and the United States, the final section undertakes an evaluation of
the idiosyncrasies and the convergence of the respective paradigms.
II. THE ARSENAL OF REMEDIES IN THE LAWS OF
DEFAMATION
A. Pecuniary Redress
As in the United States, German law provides pecuniary redress
for the defamed individual. However, the fundamental difference in
the defamation laws of the respective countries is that the American
concept relies far more on damage awards to protect the personality
of the defamed. By contrast, the German system favors a variety of
different remedies that place less emphasis upon money awards.
1. Special Compensatory Damages. In Germany, a defamation
action for compensatory damages lies under Section 823 of the Civil
Code (the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, or “BGB”): that is, when the
defendant intentionally or negligently violates the plaintiff’s

press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result the vital public-watchdog
role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable
information may be adversely affected. Having regard to the importance of the protection of
journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society and the potentially chilling effect
an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom, such a measure cannot be
compatible with Article 10 of the [European] Convention [of Human Rights] unless it is
justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest.”). But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 691, 693-701 (1972).
5. But see generally ALEXANDER BRUNS, INFORMATIONSANSPRÜCHE GEGEN MEDIEN
(1997) (arguing in favor of actions for information against media).
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constitutionally granted personality right.6 The question of whether
the plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages primarily turns upon
the distinction between statements of fact and statements of opinion.7
This differentiation is mainly rooted in the Free Speech Clause of
Article 5(1) of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz, or “GG”),
which affords special protection to mere expressions of opinion.8 As
a general rule, defamatory factual statements trigger media liability
when the plaintiff can prove the falsity of the statement. On the other
hand, statements of opinion entail actionable damages only in cases
of malicious insult (Schmähkritik),9 which under the Constitutional
Court’s restrictive interpretation hardly ever occurs. This core
distinction between statements of fact and opinion has been
sanctioned
by
the
German
Constitutional
Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht),10 although it imposes a considerable
burden on defamation plaintiffs by requiring courts to presume an
opinion rather than a statement of fact in close cases. German courts
therefore need to thoroughly evaluate whether or not the case at bar
involves a factual statement, and the scrutiny regarding whether the
statement in controversy is defamatory or not plays a more
subordinate role in German practice than in American defamation
law.
Even untrue factual statements are privileged as non-negligent if
the media defendant complied with the requirement to duly
investigate the reported matter. The burden of proving the media
defendant’s negligent deviation—which under German civil
procedure is beyond a reasonable doubt—rests with the defamed
plaintiff. Standards of investigative care appear to be verifiable only
if the plaintiff is provided access to the relevant information gathered
by the media. Since German civil procedure does not provide pretrial
discovery, defamation plaintiffs in many cases likely encounter almost
insurmountable evidentiary difficulties.11
Furthermore, a German defamation plaintiff’s actionable
damages generally are limited to actual, specifically proven economic
loss, and presumed damages cannot be obtained. Hence, unlike its

6. See § 823 BGB. See generally Thwaite & Brehm, supra note 1, at 337-39 (sketching the
constitutional background of the German personality right).
7. Cf. id. at 343-44 (providing specific examples).
8. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 5(1) (F.R.G.).
9. See id.
10. See BVerfGE 61, 1 (7-9).
11. See generally, BRUNS, supra note 5.
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counterpart in the United States, German law does not distinguish
between libel and slander.
2. General Damages for Reputational Harm and Punitive
Damages. German civil law, in satisfaction of the requirements for
compensatory damages, awards actionable damages for reputational
harm. Remarkably, it was case law relying on constitutional grounds
that first acknowledged immaterial damages, such as monetary
compensation for non-economic harm, as a remedy in favor of the
defamed; this was in disregard of both the restrictive language of the
governing sections of the German Civil Code (Sections 847 and 253)
and the legislature’s explicit intention to exempt defamation cases
from damage awards for pain and suffering.12 In its infancy, the era of
general damages for reputational harm was characterized by caution
with regard to a more frequent and more generous application of the
newly–created remedy. However, in recent years, courts have been
more frequently disposed to award higher amounts.13 Nevertheless,
German courts normally do not render judgments comparable in size
to those in American practice, presumably as a consequence of the
ample variety of remedies available.14
This recent German trend toward higher general damage awards
should not be interpreted as suggesting that German defamation law

12. See BVerfGE 34, 269 (282, 292).
13. See BGHZ 128, 1 (14) (recent decisions of Germany’s highest Appellate Court for civil
proceedings, Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen); see also 1996 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 984, 985 (referring to cases brought by Princess Caroline of Monaco);
MATTHIAS PRINZ, Geldentschädigung bei Persönlichkeitsverletzungen durch Medien, 1996
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 953, 954; MÜLLER, Ehrenschutz und Meinungsfreiheit,
1997 ARCHIV FÜR PRESSERECHT 499, 502; WALTER SEITZ, Prinz und Prinzessin—Wandlungen
des Deliktsrechts durch Zwangskommerzialisierung der Persönlichkeit, 1996 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 2848; AXEL BEATER, ZIVILRECHTLICHER SCHUTZ VOR DER PRESSE ALS
KONKRETISIERTES VERFASSUNGSRECHT 68 (1996). See generally MINELLI, Zur Ausgleichung
widerrechtlicher Medieneingriffe in die Privatsphäre, 1996 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR URHEBER- UND
MEDIENRECHT 73 (providing a Swiss perspective).
14. In America, damage awards for defamation suits are relatively infrequent, but they
tend to be much higher than their German counterparts. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987) (reducing a $3,000,000 compensatory
damages award to $1,000,000, but upholding $2,050,000 in punitive damages); Bressler v.
Fortune Magazine, 971 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1992) (reversing trial court’s judgment entered upon
jury verdict award of $550,000). In Germany, the highest awards have not exceeded
DM 100,000. Cf. 1996 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 984 (awards of DM 30,000 and
DM 50,000 were held insufficient).

288

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[10:283

is on the verge of embracing the idea of punitive damages.15 Any
form of punishment by means of civil remedies is still rather clearly
outside the province of German civil law, and its constitutionality is
questionable at best.16
B. Injunctive Relief
There is significant dissimilarity in the availability of injunctive
relief in the respective defamation laws. While plaintiffs in America
have rarely been granted injunctions to prevent defamatory
statements,17 German courts commonly use this device to restrain the
media from repeating allegedly false and defamatory reports.18 An
injunction can be issued through final judgment as a permanent
prohibition of the defamatory statement and also as a temporary
inhibitory order pending litigation of that final judgment.19 Injunctive
relief is available when (1) a plaintiff can prove that the defamatory
statement in controversy is untrue, and (2) the defendant fails to meet
the burden of showing that he or she has conformed to the duty to
investigate the facts.20 Injunctions purporting to prevent the first
publication of a possibly defamatory statement are rarely ever issued
because of the difficulty plaintiffs face in substantiating the contents
of the prospective statement.
Moreover, injunctions against
defamation have been disfavored on constitutional grounds, and
15. In implying that very conclusion, some American authors seem to overlook the
fundamental difference between general damages and punitive damages. See, e.g., MAURICE
ROSENBERG, PETER HAY & RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, CONFLICT OF LAWS 224 (10th ed. 1996).
16. See BVerfGE 91, 335 (345); see also BVerfGE 91, 140 (145-146) (ruling that service of
process regarding punitive damages litigation must be effectuated in compliance with the Hague
Service Convention); BGHZ 118, 312 (334-345) (Germany’s highest Appellate Court for civil
proceedings, Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen, holding that an “unspecified” punitive damage
award is unenforceable in Germany because of a strong countervailing public policy).
17. See Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29
HARV. L. REV. 640 (1916); see also Robert A. Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 ARK.
L. REV. 423, 431-36 (1952); Robert Allen Sedler, Injunctive Relief and Personal Integrity, 9 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 147 (1964). See, e.g., Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 2274 (1992). See generally REX S. HEINKE, MEDIA LAW § 10.9 (1994)
(providing an informative overview of recent case law). But see Advanced Training Sys. v.
Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984) (enjoining media defendents from the
reptition of statements that had previously been declared defamatory by a judgment and
therefore somewhat approximating German notions); Lemons v. Mycro Group, 667 F. Supp.
665, 667 (S.D. Iowa 1987); Retail Credit Co. v. Russel, 218 S.E.2d 54, 63 (Ga. 1975); O’Brien v.
University Comm. Tenant Union, 327 N.E.2d 753 (Ohio 1975).
18. See Thwaite & Brehm, supra note 1, at 349. See also Matthias Prinz, Germany, in
INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY, supra note 1, at 199, 205.
19. See Thwaite & Brehm, supra note 1, at 349.
20. See id.
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numerous commentators have labeled this type of remedy as
censorship.21 In any event, there is a strong need for the plaintiff to
obtain information the media defendant has collected. If the plaintiff
seeks to inhibit a future publication of a defamatory statement, there
is a manifest need for information even about the contents of a
forthcoming report.
C. Retraction and Clarification
In the course of the American defamation law reform discussion,
proposals have emerged from the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws that resemble state retraction
statutes.22 The proposed Uniform Correction or Clarification of
Defamation Act of 1993 required the plaintiff to request correction or
clarification of a defamatory statement so as to maintain the right to
sue for defamation.23 Timely and sufficient correction or clarification
by the defendant would have been a bar to any presumed or punitive
damages;24 the plaintiff’s action was subject to comparable restrictions
if the defendant offered to correct or clarify under Section 8 of the
proposed Act.25
German law has long embraced the idea of retraction and
clarification, not as defenses against damage litigation, but rather as
separate causes of action. Plaintiffs may pray for judgment ordering
the newspaper or broadcaster to retract—or at least to clarify—the
statement in controversy.26 Complete retraction (Widerruf) requires
that the plaintiff prove the falsity of the statement beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the plaintiff does not succeed in doing so, he or
she may still be entitled to a so-called restricted retraction
(eingeschränkter Widerruf), where the defendant states that he or she
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 48(a). See also Holden v. Pioneer Broad. Co., 365 P.2d 845
(Or. 1961), cert. denied 370 U.S. 157 (1962); Arizona statute was being held unconstitutional:
Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, 730 P.2d 186 (Ariz. 1986), cert. denied 481 U.S. 1029 (1987);
Montana statute was also declared unconstitutional: Madison v. Yanker, 589 P.2d 126 (Mont.
1978).
23. See UNIF. CORRECTION OR CLARIFICATION OF DEFAMATION ACT § 3, 12 U.L.A. 291
(1993). In 1995, North Dakota became the first state to enact the Uniform Act. See North
Dakota Adopts Uniform Correction Act, MEDIA L. RPTR. NEWS NOTES, May 2, 1995, at 2.
24. See UNIF. CORRECTION OR CLARIFICATION OF DEFAMATION ACT § 5, 12 U.L.A. 291
(1993).
25. See id. § 8.
26. See §§ 823, 1004 BGB; see also BGHZ 69, 181 (182). See generally EGBERT WENZEL,
DAS RECHT DER WORT- UND BILDBERICHTERSTATTUNG, no. 13.57, 13.68 (4th ed. 1994)
(providing a more detailed presentation); Prinz, supra note 18, at 205-06.
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does not uphold the defamatory statement. The plaintiff may secure
this restricted retraction if he or she can establish falsehood by a
preponderance of the evidence, and there is no serious indication that
the statement might be true. In these cases, knowledge of the media
defendant’s sources again could be extremely helpful to the plaintiff.
D. Declaratory Judgment
American reformers have called for the use of declaratory
judgment actions, which call for the court to determine not the
question of fault, but rather the veracity of the statement in
question at first glance a somewhat astonishing proposal.27
Supporters of this concept disagree on whether the decision to invoke
this remedy should rest exclusively within the plaintiff’s discretion28 or
if the defendant should also have the right to choose between
declaratory judgment and damage litigation.29 Such proposals rely
mostly on statutory intervention by the legislature, although
contemporary civil procedural law also provides for declaratory
judgments.30
German doctrine envisages a more or less comparable problem:
practice and prevailing doctrine have not yet endorsed the concept of
a declaratory judgment action, even though a judgment stating the
infringement of personality rights can be subsumed under the
language of the governing provision of the German Civil Procedure
Code (Zivilprozessordnung, or “ZPO”).31 Opponents of declaratory
judgments argue that adjudicating the veracity of a statement is not
an appropriate issue for civil litigation because the judiciary was not
meant to resolve factual controversies independent of any substantive
legal issue.
However, the declaration of an infringement of the personality
right does require the court to dispose of a legal issue, especially if
one takes into account that the media may be justified in publishing



27. See ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY STUDY OF
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL LAW: THE REPORT OF
THE LIBEL REFORM PROJECT OF THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM 11-12, 16, 22
(1988).
28. See Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74
CAL. L. REV. 809, 836-42 (1986).
29. See David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgment for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 847, 864-80 (1986).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 57 and the corresponding state law
provisions.
31. See § 256 ZPO.
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falsities if they have followed the journalistic standard of care. Thus,
the Juristentag, Germany’s most influential private association of
lawyers, proposed a resolution in 1990 to modify the text of Section
256 of the ZPO to clarify that an action for declaratory judgment lies
in defamation cases.32 The legislature, however, has yet to take any
action in furtherance of this proposal, presumably because German
politicians are anxious to preserve their good relations with the
media—a desire probably shared by their American colleagues.
E. Right to Reply
Another remedy in German defamation law that is unfamiliar to
many American jurists is the right to reply (Gegendarstellung). The
question of veracity notwithstanding, the press and media codes of
the sixteen German states (Bundesländer) afford a right to reply.33
An individual personally affected by a published statement may seek
to order the newspaper or broadcaster to publish a factual response
of comparable publicity. Since this remedy is to be pursued in
accelerated proceedings similar to those for temporary injunctions, it
establishes a highly effective device to vindicate personality rights,
and its core is even constitutionally warranted.34
F. German Reform Discussion
In Germany, recent reform considerations have been stimulated
through the 58th Congress of the German Juristentag of 1990 in
Munich, of which one section dealt with the conflict of media freedom
and personality rights.35 The Congress first addressed the overarching
question of whether a new and more sophisticated federal
codification in the field of mass media and personality law would be
advisable; it answered in the affirmative.36 However, the Congress

32. See SITZUNGSBERICHT K ZUM 58. DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG, p. 218 No. 3 lit. g
(Ständige Deputation des Deutschen Juristentages ed., 1990) [hereinafter SITZUNGSBERICHT].
33. See Prinz, supra note 18, at 202-05; see also Karina Hesse, The Right of Reply under
German Press Law, in MEDIA LAW IN EUROPE 97-102 (Löw & Vorderwülbecke eds., 1994).
See generally SEITZ, SCHMIDT & SCHOENER, DER GEGENDARSTELLUNGSANSPRUCH IN
PRESSE, FILM, FUNK UND FERNSEHEN (2d ed. 1990) (providing a detailed exploration in
German); BIRGIT KOCH, RECHTSSCHUTZ DURCH GEGENDARSTELLUNG IN FRANKREICH UND
DEUTSCHLAND (1995) (providing a comparative approach).
34. See BVerfGE 63, 131 (142); see also BVerfGE 73, 118 (201); 1994 DEUTSCH–
DEUTSCHE RECHTSZEITSCHRIFT 67; STÜRNER, supra note 2, at 875.
35. See generally ROLF STÜRNER, GUTACHTEN FÜR DEN 58. DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG
(1990) (providing an instructive overview of the agenda and issues).
36. See SITZUNGSBERICHT, supra note 32, at 218.
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failed to achieve a consensus on how such a comprehensive
codification should be conditioned. The majority’s proposal to clarify
the statutory basis for declaratory judgment actions has already been
discussed.37 However, the option of increased damage awards was
rejected,38 and in this respect, an approximation to American
standards is not likely to evolve, at least for the time being. The
majority also favored a uniform federal codification of the right to
reply in order to abolish the labyrinthine network of provisions
among the sixteen Bundesländer.39
Finally, although several
parliamentary initiatives and a proposed 1974 Federal Press Code
Bill40 raised the possibility of actions for information, this issue was
only marginally addressed at the Congress, and the legislature has
unfortunately not yet promoted any of these generally desirable
propositions.
III. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCESS TO INTERNAL
MEDIA INFORMATION
A. Procedural Posture
Before addressing the requirements a defamation plaintiff must
satisfy in order to gain access to internal media information, one
should visualize the typical procedural posture of defamation
litigation. In the American setting, the procedural outset is plain: the
plaintiff may obtain pretrial discovery pursuant to Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure41 and the corresponding state law
provisions. Discovery of internal media information, however, is
likely to collide with First Amendment guaranties and state shield
statutes.42 This conflict culminates in cases where a confidential
informer’s anonymity is at stake and a plaintiff seeking punitive
damages wants to establish the standard of actual malice used in New
43
York Times v. Sullivan.

37. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
38. See SITZUNGSBERICHT, supra note 32, at 218.
39. See id. at 219.
40. See HOFFMANN-RIEM/PLANDER, RECHTSFRAGEN DER PRESSEREFORM 213, 216
(1977).
41. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
42. See discussion infra Part V for problems arising under constitutional and statutory
provisions.
43. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW 519-21 (5th ed. 1995).
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German defamation litigants encounter similar—if not more
complicated—intricacies in the absence of pretrial discovery. Since
prospective media defendants are not prone to expose the
information on which an allegedly defamatory publication is based, a
German plaintiff usually will need to commence an action for
information in order to prepare the evidentiary basis for a subsequent
suit in pursuit of various remedies. Proceedings for information may
either be brought as separate actions or joined with the plea for the
subsequent remedy pursuant to Section 254 of the German Civil
Procedure Code44 (Stufenklage, literally “step-action”).45 In the latter
case, once the information issue has been adjudicated in the
affirmative and the information has been provided, the plaintiff may
proceed on the merits of the remedy sought. This procedural scheme
resembles American pretrial discovery only in some regards, namely
insofar as it presents a bifurcated proceeding designed both to clarify
the evidentiary basis in a first stage and eventually to try the facts
underlying the ultimate remedy. Although actions for information
are the typical means for plaintiffs to mitigate their burden of proof,
until very recently, prevailing German doctrine has not even
pondered making information actions available to defamation
plaintiffs on a broader scale. The latest proposals to provide more
generously for information actions in defamation cases can be
expected to meet determined opposition on the grounds of the
Freedom of Media Clause of Article 5(1) of the German
Constitution.46
B. Material Requirements
American civil procedure allows pretrial discovery regarding
internal media information under the very broadly construed
relevancy test of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)47 and its
state analogues. The German counterpart, the information action, is
based on an analogy both to existing federal statutory preparatory
information claims48 and to rights to obtain information on personal
44. § 254 ZPO.
45. See generally BRUNS, supra note 5, at 263-77 (providing further details).
46. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 5(1) (F.R.G.). The idea of actions for
information in defamation and invasion of privacy cases is developed and favored by BRUNS,
supra note 5, at 152-233.
47. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
48. See, e.g., § 666 (alt. 3) BGB and its systemic progeny: §§ 1698 subs. 1 and 2, 1890, 1978
subs. 1, 2130 subs. 2 BGB; § 740 subs. 2 alt. 1 BGB; § 235 subs. 3 alt. 1 HGB; § 1214 subs. 1
BGB; see also, §§ 97 subs. 1 clause 2, 101 a Copyright Code, § 19 Trademark Code, § 140 b
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data gathered by media, the latter being laid down in data protection
and media codes of the sixteen Bundesländer.49 Moreover, the
German Constitutional Court—in sharp contrast to present American
notions of data protection—acknowledged a constitutionally
anchored “right to informational self-determination” (Recht auf
informationelle Selbstbestimmung), which essentially grants a
minimum standard of data protection.50 The core of this right to data
protection is an individual’s right to know who has information
concerning him or her and exactly what they have.51 Hence, a rather
strong argument can be made that the German Constitution demands
a certain amount of access to internal media information with regards
to defamation, as such information is collected for a purpose.
Although the prerequisites for an information action are highly
controversial, one could argue that the plaintiff is required to produce
factual leads showing reasonably meritorious prospects for the
remedy ultimately pursued.52 It is not necessary for the information
plaintiff to substantiate the merits of the remedy by a preponderance
of the evidence or to establish a prima facie case. Normally, the
plaintiff will satisfy the burden by making it appear reasonably
plausible that the defamatory statement is false. Still this threshold
requirement is far more difficult to meet than obtaining pretrial
discovery. On the other hand, American pretrial practice, taking into
Patent Code, § 24 b Design Protection Code, § 9 Semi-Conductor Protection Code. For more
details, see BRUNS, supra note 5, at 163-64.
49. § 41 subs. 3 Federal Data Protection Act; § 31 subs. 3 Data Protection Act (DPA)
Baden-Württemberg; Art. 21 subs. 3 Broadcasting Act Bayern; § 45 subs. 3 Ostdeutscher
Rundfunk Brandenburg Act; § 50 subs. 3 Westdeutscher Rundfunk Act; § 74 subs. 7
Broadcasting Act Saarland; Art. 20 subs. 3 Media Act Bayern; § 46 subs. 3 Broadcasting Act
Nordrhein-Westfalen; § 31 subs. 3 Broadcasting Act Rheinland-Pfalz; § 57 subs. 3 Private
Broadcasting Act Thüringen; § 50 subs. 2 Media Act Bremen; § 50 subs. 2 Media Act Hamburg;
§ 63 subs. 6 Broadcasting Act Saarland. Rather complicated technical details of this newly
generated analogy are not essential to the understanding of the outlines of the German concept
and, therefore, are not supposed to be of special interest to American scholars. For more
details, see BRUNS, supra note 5, at 163-67.
50. See BVerfGE 65, 1 (41-52).
51. Many European data protection codes afford such a right to know. See, e.g., France
(Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 1978, J.O. 1978, 227); England (Data Protection Act, 1984, § 21, sced. 1);
Austria (§§ 11, 25 Bundesgesetz über den Schutz personenbezogener Daten BGBl 350,
565/1978, as amended by Bundesgesetz vom 27.06.1986, BGBl 237, 370/1986); Belgium (Data
Protection Act, 1992, Art. 1 § 1); Sweden (Datalag, 1973, § 10(1)); Denmark (lov nr. 293 om
private registre m. v. af 8 juni 1978, Lovtidende A 1978, 833, amended by lov nr. 383 af 10 juni
1987, Lovtidende A 1987, 1300; lov nr. 294 om offentlige myndigheders registre af 8 juni 1978,
Lovtidende A 1978, 839); Norway (§ 7 lov om personregistre m. m. af 9 juni 1978, Norsk
Lovtidend 1978, Avd. 1, Nr. 48, 402).
52. See BRUNS, supra note 5, at 179-86.
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consideration First Amendment concerns, often restricts its generally
wide range discovery approach in the context of defamation litigation
against media.53 Thus, the apparently wide gulf between the
American and the German procedural frameworks narrows
somewhat upon examination of the constitutional and statutory limits
on pretrial discovery against media defendants in defamation
lawsuits.
IV. THE TYPE OF ACCESSIBLE INFORMATION
At first glance from an American perspective, the scope of
discoverable information in defamation cases bears no specific
problem.
First Amendment and statutory restrictions
notwithstanding, the media defendant is generally required to
produce every imaginable kind of evidentiary material, including
documents, photographs, tapes, or material gathered, obtained,
processed, or edited in the course of preparing the allegedly
defamatory publication. The same applies to pre-publication drafts.
In Germany, media defendants are obliged to provide written
information on the factual results of preparatory investigation insofar
as these facts concern the plaintiff.54 They may deny access to
editorial opinions on the ground that Article 5(1) of the German
Constitution55 privileges editorial secrecy.56 Special problems arise as
to whether a plaintiff is entitled to learn about the contents of a
forthcoming manuscript, as German defamation law affords an
injunction against defamation.57
Knowledge about a future
publication may therefore be of exceptional importance. On the
other hand, the editorial privilege urges some caution before courts
intrude into editors’ constitutionally protected sphere. If, however, a
plaintiff can present evidence that a newspaper or broadcaster is
about to publish a defamatory statement, the editorial privilege
should yield.58

53. See infra Part V.A.
54. See BRUNS, supra note 5, at 204-06.
55. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 5(1) (F.R.G.).
56. The German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has assumed a qualified
rather than an absolute privilege. See BVerfGE 66, 116 (133-135); BVerfGE 77, 65 (74-75);
1997 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 386-87.
57. See supra Part II.B.
58. See BRUNS, supra note 5, at 77-78, 171-72.
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V. THE JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE NOT TO REVEAL
SOURCES
American journalists and media operations may invoke the First
Amendment and exercise their privilege not to reveal sources.
Similarly, Article 5(1) of the German Constitution59 imposes limits on
the scope of available information in defamation cases. Perhaps the
sharpest contrast between the two legal systems in this regard is that,
unlike German law, American state law provides a remarkable body
of shield statutes setting forth a reporter’s privilege. Since court
decisions and literature on the journalist’s privilege in America are
already abundant,60 a rather concise outline of American law may
suffice for the purpose of this comparative exploration. Following
this summary, the German journalist’s privilege not to reveal sources
will be addressed.
A. The American Journalist’s Privilege
1. First Amendment Protection. The common law does not
confer any privilege on media defendants.61 In the leading Supreme
Court decision of Branzburg v. Hayes,62 a five-justice majority held
that reporters are not entitled to any First Amendment privilege
when called upon to testify in grand jury proceedings.63 Although the
Court rejected the notion of a First Amendment privilege not to
reveal sources even when the information was procured in
confidentiality, this decision can be considered anything but the last
word on a journalist’s First Amendment privilege. First, the Supreme
Court’s holding referred to grand jury proceedings and not to civil
litigation; it specifically did not address the issue of media defendants
in defamation suits. Second, and more importantly, Justice Powell’s
concurrence acknowledged First Amendment protection for

59. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 5(1) (F.R.G.).
60. See, e.g., 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 5426, 712-14 (1980); REX S. HEINKE, MEDIA LAW §§ 14.1-14.8 (1994); C.
THOMAS DIENES, LEE LEVINE & ROBERT C. LIND, NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW §§ 14.116.3, (1997); JOHN D. ZELESNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW 255-73 (2d ed. 1997); RALPH
HOLSINGER & JOHN PAUL DILTS, MEDIA LAW 314-61 (4th ed. 1997).
61. For a historical analysis, see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 60, at 714-26; Sam J.
Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 235-36 (1974); Talbot
D’Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources of Information, 6
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 309-14 (1969).
62. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
63. See id. at 690-91.
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confidential sources, provided that the link between the information
sought and the subject matter of the grand jury investigation is
attenuated.64 Given the bare majority of the Branzburg Court, the
decision was widely conceived as acknowledging a qualified First
Amendment privilege. This viewpoint was bolstered by vigorous
academic criticism.65
In Herbert v. Lando,66 the Supreme Court, inter alia, addressed
the discoverability of editorial opinions in a defamation lawsuit
against journalists and a broadcaster. The Court denied a “privilege
for the editorial process” insofar as it was crucial for a plaintiff
asserting actual malice to obtain discovery regarding the journalist’s
state of mind.67 Defamation plaintiffs were not obliged to make a
prima facie showing of the falsity of the defamatory statement.68 On
the other hand, the Supreme Court held that mere curiosity or a
common public interest would not suffice to justify disclosure of the
internal editorial process. Despite distinct criticism from media
advocates,69 most scholarly opinion sided with the Court.70
In the aftermath of Branzburg and Herbert, lower courts have
generally followed the Supreme Court’s rejection of the notion of an
absolute journalist’s privilege. However, the overwhelming majority
of courts have adhered to a qualified First Amendment privilege. For
example, the Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals has embraced a
qualified First Amendment privilege not to reveal sources.71 Only the
64. See id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
65. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 60, at 743.
66. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
67. Id. at 170.
68. See id. at 174 n.23. But see id. at 180 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Address at the Dedication of the Samuel I. Newhouse
Center for Law and Justice in Newark, N.J., 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 179-80 (1979).
70. See Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to “The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 610-11 (1983).
71. See, e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Corp., 633 F.2d 586, 595-96 (1st
Cir. 1980) (newspaper sued for defamation); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.
1983) (media witness in criminal proceedings), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Krase v. Graco
Children Products, Inc., 79 F.3d 346, 351-353 (2d Cir. 1996) (media witness in product liability
case). But see United States v. Cutler, 6 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1993) (privilege claim of media
witness in criminal proceedings rejected); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3rd
Cir. 1980) (criminal proceedings), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); LaRouche v. National
Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986) (libel action against broadcaster), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 818 (1986); Church of Scientology Int’l v. Daniels, 992 F.2d 1329, 1335 (4th Cir. 1993)
(media witness in defamation suit), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 869 (1993); Miller v. Transamerican
Press, 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980) (defamation suit against print medium), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1041 (1981); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1972) (libel media
defendant); Mark v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993) (media witness in defamation
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Sixth Circuit has explicitly rejected a privilege in grand jury
proceedings.72
Most courts, in evaluating whether a First Amendment privilege
applies, employ a three-part test partly derived from the dissent in
73
Branzburg by Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall, and with an
element of an earlier Second Circuit holding in Garland v. Torre.74
This three-part scrutiny affords First Amendment protection for
confidential media information only if (1) the defendant is likely to
have definite, clearly relevant information, (2) that information is not
otherwise obtainable, and (3) the information sought goes “to the
heart of the plaintiff’s claim.”75 The third part of this narrow
threshold test stems from the 1958 Garland decision, which disposed
of a mere testimonial privilege in civil proceedings. Since plaintiffs in
defamation cases frequently need to call confidential informants to
the witness stand to prove actual malice, media defendants are
seldom completely successful in invoking First Amendment
protection.76 Sometimes delay tactics may prove effective, as the
defendants can often show that the information sought is otherwise
obtainable.77 Efforts to deny discovery of editorial remarks or
opinions, however, are hardly ever successful.78
2. Statutory Shield Law. It would take a small treatise to fully
analyze the thirty state shield laws governing journalistic privileges.79
litigation against a third person); Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 421, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (media
witness in defamation against a third person); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433,
436-37 (10th Cir. 1977) (media witness in civil litigation); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (non-party journalist in civil litigation).
72. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1987).
73. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725.
74. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
75. Garland, 259 F.2d at 549.
76. See, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 638-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Miller, 621 F.2d at 726727; DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., Inc., 507 F.Supp. 880, 886 (D. Haw. 1981); Dangerfield v. Star
Editorial, Inc., 817 F.Supp. 833, 838-39 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Aequitron Medical, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9485 at 1, 9 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1995).
77. See, e.g., Dangerfield, 817 F. Supp at 838; LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139.
78. See Aequitron Medical, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9485 at 1, 9 (S.D.N.Y.
July 6, 1995).
79. The following jurisdictions provide for some statutory protection of journalistic
sources: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1995); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300-390
(Michie 1998); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2214, 12-2237 (West 1994); Arkansas,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (Michie 1987); California, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1995),
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-90-119, 24-72.5-101-106 (1999);
Delaware, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1999); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-4702-4704 (1997); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1995); Illinois, 735 ILL.
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For this comparative presentation, a summary should suffice.80
Except for a few states,81 most shield laws apply to both state and
federal proceedings. As a general rule, statutory protection shields
newspapers and broadcasters alike.82 Apparently as a consequence of
the Branzburg decision, Delaware exempts grand jury proceedings.83
Some other statutes set forth special rules for defamation or libel
cases.84 The recently enacted South Carolina shield statute restricts
its applicability to parties in interest to the proceedings.85
Shield statutes normally afford a privilege to both confidential
and non-confidential sources. However, Delaware and New Mexico
confine their privilege to confidential sources.86 New York permits an
absolute privilege for confidential sources and a qualified privilege
for non-confidential sources.87 The Indiana journalist has a far-

COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-901-5/8-909 (West 1992); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Michie
1998); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin-Banks 1999); Louisiana, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-45:1459 (West 1999); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 9-112 (1998); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.945(1) (West 1994); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-025 (West 1988); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901-26-903
(1998); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-144-20-146 (Michie 1999); Nevada, NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (Michie 1996); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21-29 (West 1994);
New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-514 (Michie 1999); New York, N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW
§ 79-h (West 1992); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1996); Ohio, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 3729.12 (Baldwin 1994); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506
(West 1993); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-540 (1988); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5942 (West 1982); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-3 (1997); South Carolina,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (Law. Co-op. 1999); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208
(1980). For a comprehensive survey on these statutory provisions, see the references cited supra
note 60.
80. The history of shield law legislation began as early as 1898 when Maryland launched
the first reporter’s privilege statute. For historical data, see Ervin, supra note 61, at 237;
D’Alemberte, supra note 61, at 327.
81. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(1)(e) (1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.023 (West
1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (Baldwin 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506
(West 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(a) (1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (West
1982) (“No person . . . shall be required to disclose . . . in any legal proceeding, trial or
investigation before any government unit.” (emphasis added)).
82. Exceptional in this regard is the Arkansas shield law which mentions radio, but not
television broadcasters. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (Michie 1987).
83. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320 (1), 4322 (1999).
84. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(5) (1999); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-903
(West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1454 (West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.025 (West
1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.530(3) (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(b) (1980).
85. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100(A) (Law. Co-op. 1999).
86. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 4322 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-514(b)(1) (Michie
1999).
87. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b), (c) (West 1992).
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reaching privilege that includes even published sources.88 Faced with
this type of shield, plaintiffs are left to conduct their own
investigations.
An examination of the protection standards for journalists’
research material reveals three crucial concepts: (1) roughly one-third
of all statutes provide no protection to gathered information;89 (2)
about a third accord a privilege to unpublished information;90 and (3)
the remaining states declare a sweeping privilege to all obtained
information.91 Confidentiality is requisite only in Delaware,92 New
Mexico,93 and, with respect to an absolute privilege, New York.94
Evidently, a tendency has emerged in recent years towards extending
statutory privileges to include all research material. By contrast, state
legislation tends to exclude from protection editorial opinions or,
even more broadly, the journalist’s work product,95 in accordance with
Herbert.

88. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Michie 1998). Similarly under the 1993 South
Carolina privilege statute, publication of the protected material does not constitute a waiver,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100(C) (Law. Co-op. 1999).
89. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania.
90. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (a)-(c), CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (b); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 45:1459(B) (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112(c)(2) (1998); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.945(1) sec. 5a(1) (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.023 (West
1988); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-146 (2) (Michie 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275
(Michie 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506(b)(2) (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 44.520(1)(b) (1988).
91. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(2) (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4702(2)
(1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902(1) (1998); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A-21 rule 27(b) (West 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1996); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 19-11-100(A) (Law. Co-op. 1999); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(a) (1980).
92. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 4322 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-514(b)(2) (Michie
1999); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (West 1992).
93. New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-514(b)(2) (Michie 1999).
94. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (West 1992).
95. But see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119(b) (1999) (“. . .any news information received,
observed, processed, prepared, written, or edited by a newsperson . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 249-30 (1995) (“. . . any information, document, or item obtained or prepared in the gathering or
dissemination of news . . .” (emphasis added)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.945(1) sec. 5a(1)
(West 1994) (“. . . any unpublished matter or documentation, . . ., relating to a communication
with an informant . . .” (emphasis added)); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.272 (Michie 1996) (“. . .
any . . .information obtained or prepared . . .in gathering, receiving or processing
information . . .” (emphasis added)); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.520(1)(b), (2) (1988) (“. . . Any
unpublished information obtained or prepared . . . in the course of gathering, receiving or
processing information . . .” (emphasis added)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100(A) (Law. Co-op.
1999) (“. . . any information, document, or item obtained or prepared in the gathering or
dissemination of news . . .” (emphasis added)).
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Regarding the legal consequences of statutory privileges, most
states bar sanctions against journalists who refuse to disclose
privileged information. The vast majority of the shield laws broadly
prohibit “compelled disclosure.” This includes contempt sanctions
and also, for example, shifting the burden of proof or striking out
pleadings or evidentiary material. California and New York are
notable exceptions: both states bar contempt measures but permit any
other available sanction.96
Little more than half of the statutes provide, in various forms, an
absolute privilege.97 However, about one-half of these absolute
privileges are confined to mere sources or informants.98 The other
half tend to extend their absolute statutory privilege either to
collected research material,99 or to unpublished100 or confidential
information.101 The statutory guarantee of absolute journalistic
privilege manifests a significant departure from the First Amendment
privilege as construed by case law. The criteria for qualified
protection vary. Mostly, however, the shield statutes rely on a level
scrutiny similar to that employed by the majority of courts in
determining the First Amendment privilege.102
These special
provisions notwithstanding, “general” privilege rules are applicable.
96. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (a), (b), CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (b); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-h (b), (c) (West 1992).
97. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2214, 12-2237 (West
1994); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1995), CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2; DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 4322, 4323 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4702, 4703(b) (1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1
(Michie 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin-Banks 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 9-112(c), (d)(2) (1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.945(1) sec. 5a(1) (West
1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902(1) (1998); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-146 (Michie 1999);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (Michie 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21rule 27, 2A:84A21.3 (West 1994) (excluding criminal proceedings); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (West
1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 3729.12 (Baldwin 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(1)
(1988); 42 P.A. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(A) (West 1982).
98. This is the case in Alabama, Arizona, Delaware (confidential sources), District of
Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky (no protection regarding informants who engage in criminal
conduct—therefore, statutory privilege did not apply in Branzburg v. Hayes), Maryland, Ohio,
Pennsylvania.
99. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-902(1), 26-903 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 49.275 (Michie 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 rule 27(b) (West 1994) (excluding
criminal proceedings).
100. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(a), (b), CAL. CONST. art. I § 2(b); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 28.945(1) sec. 5a(1) (West 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-146(2) (Michie
1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(1)(b) (1988).
101. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(b) (West 1992).
102. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. For example, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-90119(3), 13-24-72, 13-5-104 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4703(a) (1997) (not with respect to
informants), GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1995) (third requirement modified: “. . . necessary to
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By and large, contemporary American law does not strictly
protect internal media information in defamation litigation. Mostly,
internal media information, sources, and the identity of informants
are obtainable in discovery, provided that the plaintiff can show that
the information sought is crucial to his claim. Hence, in defamation
cases, the defendant’s reliance on statutory, or even on First
Amendment protection, with the exception of some limited absolute
statutory privileges, is hardly ever successful.
B. Substantive Restrictions of Information Actions in Germany
German private media law places its particular parameters on
information actions in defamation cases. Since the development of
information claims in German defamation law is a rather recent
phenomenon, majority and plurality opinions have not yet
crystallized, nor has a consensus emerged from academic discussion.
However, limitations of information actions in the law of defamation
can be inferred by analogizing to generally accepted limits of
preparatory information claims, as well as to some landmark
decisions of the German Constitutional Court.
First, the peril of self-incrimination does not justify barring a
plaintiff access to information obtained from a journalistic
investigation. Although a privilege against self-incrimination is
constitutionally granted in penal and administrative proceedings,103 it
is generally accepted that defendants in a civil information action may
not withhold information on the basis of self-incrimination.104 The
the proper preparation or presentation of the case . . .”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1459 (B),
(D) (West 1999) (regarding non-confidential information); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 9-112(d) (1998) (prerequisites must be shown “by clear and convincing evidence”); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.945(1) sec. 5a (a) (West 1994) (excluding life-sentencing proceedings);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.024(2) (West 1988) (conditions need be proven “by clear and
convincing evidence” and disclosure must be necessary to prevent injustice—proviso regarding
defamation cases, see supra note 84); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-514(c) (Michie 1999) (requirements
are to be proven by “preponderance of evidence”); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(c) (West
1992) (for non-confidential information and informants); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2506(B)(2) (West 1993) (information sought need only be relevant for a significant issue and
not otherwise available); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100(B) (Law. Co-op. 1999) (requirements
must be established by “clear and convincing evidence”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(2)
(1980) (requires showing of need “by clear and convincing evidence” as well as preponderant
and compelling public interest in disclosure).
103. See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 1(1), 20 (F.R.G.).
104. See BGHZ 41, 318 (322); 1990 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 510, 511. But see
1957 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 669. Representative of the prevalent view among
academics is PALANDT/HEINRICHS, BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, § 261 N. 4 (56th ed. 1997);
ROLF STÜRNER, DIE AUFKLÄRUNGSPFLICHT DER PARTEIEN DES ZIVILPROZESSES 365 (1976);
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rationale for this restrictive interpretation is that information
plaintiffs should not be penalized by the criminal conduct of
defendants. In penal proceedings, the inadmissibility of evidence
revealed through coercion accounts for a defendant’s interest in not
being compelled to produce self-incriminating evidence.105
Another potential curb on journalists’ obligations to disclose
background material is their personality right.106 However, intrusion
into a journalist’s private sphere does not of itself justify barring the
plaintiff’s information claim. A journalist may be compelled to
answer the defamation plaintiff’s questions and comply with
document production requests, even if these materials are stored at
home or are the result of “private” conversations with an informant.107
On the other hand, the journalist’s personality right prevails with
respect to intimate diary notes taken in the course of gathering
material.108 Other limits valid for general preparatory information
claims impose no significant or further restrictions on actions for
information in defamation cases.
More important than these general limits are potential
constitutional limits on German journalists’ duties to disclose relevant
information. The constitutional requirements can be reduced to three
main issues: freedom of collecting information, secrecy of editorial
process, and protection of confidential informants. The freedom of
collecting information is outweighed by a defamed individual’s
interest in remaining informed about factual background material so
that he or she can prepare for litigation of the substantive remedies.109
The editorial privilege pertains only to journalistic opinions,
comments, and internal assessments of the factual basis.110 Thus, the
gathered material itself may constitutionally be subject to compelled
disclosure.
However, in order to maintain the free flow of
information, informants’ identities are absolutely privileged.111 This
characteristic feature of German law reflects that, unlike American
PETER WINKLER VON MOHRENFELS, ABGELEITETE INFORMATIONSLEISTUNGSPFLICHTEN IM
DEUTSCHEN ZIVILRECHT 100-01 (1986).
105. See BVerfGE 56, 37 (48-51). See also Rolf Stürner, Strafrechtliche Selbstbelastung und
verfahrensförmige Wahrheitsermittlung, 1981 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1757.
106. See supra Part II.A.1.
107. See BRUNS, supra note 5, at 238-40.
108. See WINKLER VON MOHRENFELS, supra note 104 at 98; Stürner, supra note 105 at 370;
see also BGHSt 19, 325 (diary is inadmissible evidence in criminal proceedings).
109. See BRUNS, supra note 5, at 246.
110. See id. at 247.
111. See id. at 248-50.
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evidence law, German civil procedure is not governed by the hearsay
rule.112 Therefore, the journalist may testify about the contents of
confidential conversations without revealing an informant’s identity.
It could be argued that the absolute protection of informants’
anonymity compensates the media for its exposure to a broader
variety of civil remedies. This latter argument is not compelling in
light of the American media’s susceptibility to significantly higher
damage awards.
Editorial and informant privileges raise questions as to how a
plaintiff may obtain information and what information may be
withheld by the journalist. In camera inspection of evidence113 is
generally unknown to German civil procedure.114 However, where
there is an apparently irreconcilable divergence of the plaintiff’s
information claim and the media defendant’s secrecy interest, there is
the option to use a neutral third party, such as a notary, who
scrutinizes the material in question and sorts out privileged
information.115 In these cases, the plaintiff may ask the court to order
the media defendant to turn its files over to the neutral party, which
examines the internal information pertinent to the allegedly
defamatory publication. The material is edited by the neutral party to
protect informants’ identities. Any permissible information is given
to the plaintiff. In form, as well as in the results, this technique
resembles the American in camera inspection. Hence, the German
reluctance to permit in camera inspections is difficult to explain and
may lie simply in historical practice.
VI. IDIOSYNCRASIES AND CONVERGENCE OF THE
RESPECTIVE SCHEMES
Defamation litigation in the United States and Germany is
similar in many respects. Both systems harbor idiosyncratic notions
of how to balance competing interests and rights of modern mass
media and individuals. The most discernable substantive difference
112. For comprehensive commentaries on the hearsay rule, see MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE §§ 6691-7070 (Interim ed. 1997).
113. See, e.g., Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 853 F. Supp. 147, 147-48 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
114. The only explicit exception in this regard is section 259, clause 2 of the Commercial
Code. See § 259 Cl. 2 HGB. German practicioners and scholars, pondering on in camera
inspections, face considerable difficulties with the traditional German interpretation of the
adversary system and even constitutional arguments based on the right to be heard. Yet, the
notion of employing in camera inspections on a broader scale has been rejected. See BRUNS,
supra note 5, at 256-60.
115. See id. at 251-56.
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lies in the variety of remedies available in defamation cases. The
American reliance on pecuniary redress reflects the common law
tradition of money awards as the legal system’s central response to
wrongful conduct. The contingency fee practice, having emerged
from the American rule that each party pays its own litigation costs,
has probably rendered this money award-centered remedial concept
an almost irrefutable principle. In defamation actions against media,
the menace of comparably high damage awards might tend to
disfavor or even endanger smaller newspapers and broadcasters. The
more colorful German remedial palette, in contrast, eschews
emphasizing monetary relief; German courts and legislators are
reluctant to endorse heightened damage awards. However, given the
American jury system, Germany’s complicated, variegated arsenal of
remedies cannot be recommended to the United States without
reservation. Apart from the question of whether a jury trial should
be available in actions for retraction, injunction, or reply, it seems
plain that adoption of these procedural remedies would import alien
concepts into the American system of defamation law. Such legal
implants would likely face constitutional objection and cultural
rejection.
The German system, with its use of professional judges in lieu of
lay juries as triers of fact, seems better positioned to handle this
intricate array of remedies. Nonetheless, the Achilles heel of German
civil procedure is its lack of pretrial discovery. Plaintiffs generally
commence a preparatory information lawsuit to clarify and assess the
evidentiary basis of the “real” action. With German practice tending
to limit information actions so as not to duplicate litigation
“unnecessarily,” plaintiffs in defamation suits have encountered
serious difficulties in preparing for litigation concerning the eventual
remedy.
Germany’s reluctant departure from the traditional
provision of information to defamation plaintiffs suggests a modest
convergence of the respective legal systems.
In the United States, determining the scope and limits of the
journalist’s privilege not to reveal sources requires more investigative
proficiency and patience than the majority of continental European
scholars would imagine. There is no such thing as a uniform
American journalist privilege. In Germany, matters are resolved by
one federal, civil, and civil procedural law. The absence of a strict
hearsay rule in German civil procedure appears to be but a technical
reason for the intensified protection of informants. At least arguably,
the perseverance of German courts and doctrine in protecting the
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identity of confidential informants against compelled disclosure
reveals a fundamentally different conception of a democratic polity.
The essential free flow of information to the media in the rather
paternalistic German perspective calls upon the state, be it
legislature, administration, or judiciary, to secure and safeguard the
basic conditions of democracy. American law, by contrast, might
reflect a society of self-determined individuals who can take care of
themselves. Thus, informants who want to remain anonymous are
expected to transmit sensitive information anonymously. The media
may let informants know that their capability to assist them in
protecting against disclosure of identity is limited. Ultimately, free
flow of information is warranted either way. Yet, while the American
legal system, perhaps driven by an inherent resentment of excessive
state power and control, tends to de-emphasize regulatory
intervention, German legal culture relies more on state administered
and supervised safeguards. The key to this very antagonism may lie
in history.
Intriguing is the convergence of the respective schemes of
defamation litigation regarding a plaintiff’s access to internal media
information. Despite seemingly irreconcilable systemic differences,
both American and German defamation proceedings are governed by
a principle of generous access to media sources in favor of defamation
plaintiffs. This remarkable transatlantic congeniality may flow from
manifold wells. One reason could be the general perception that
mass media—as a “fourth power” alongside the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches—has become so powerful that it must have
some constraints. This rationale, however, cannot explain why there
should be guaranteed access to internal media information. Another
explanation might be the present tendency in our modern media
societies toward informative transparency: why should individuals
who have been exposed to the public spotlight not participate in, and
profit from, a “free flow of information?” From this perspective, the
media’s resistance to affording allegedly defamed individuals
unrestricted access to internal information mirrors a very human
propensity to monopolize the availability of information. Whether
this propensity is justifiable poses a different question. It may well be
argued that since free and vigorous media depend upon unfettered
access to information, they should not strive, nor be entitled, to erect
an insuperable bulwark against disclosure of background material in
defamation litigation. Apparently, in democracies on both sides of
the Atlantic Ocean, this fundamental idea has taken effect.

